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forced to speak and risk incriminating himself both at the disciplinary
hearing and possibly in future criminal proceedings 6 or to keep silent
and accept the burden of giving up his defense while preseriting an
admission of his guilt to the disciplinry board.9 7 The combined effect
of the two decisions is to place the prisoner in a procedural vise from
which there is no foreseeable release.
ELLEN KABCENELL WAYNE
Equal Credit Opportunity Act Amendments of 1976-An Over-
view of the New Law
As the American consumer credit industry has grown, lawmakers
repeatedly have turned to legislation and regulation in an effort to con-
trol abuse and discourage the development of unfair credit policies.'
Part of this effort is represented by the Equal Credit Opportunity Act
Amendments of 1976,2 passed in March, 1976, only five months after
the original legislation became effective.' The most ambitious and
controversial amendments expand the existing ban on discriminatory
credit-granting procedures, impose new disclosure requirements on
lending institutions and increase the statutory limits on creditor liability.
Creditors insist that these amendments and the corresponding regu-
96. In light of the Court's view that Miranda is completely inapplicable to this sit-
uation, it is unclear whether the absence of protection for the fifth amendment privilege
would cause self-incriminatory testimony given at a disciplinary procedure to be ex-
cluded from a later criminal trial.
97. 328 F. Supp. at 778.
1. Legislation in this area includes the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act
of 1974, 12 U.S.C. § 1730f, 1831b, 2601-2617 (Supp. V 1975), and the Consumer
Credit Protection Act, 15 U.S.C.A. 55 1601-1691f (West 1974, Cum. Supp. 1976, Supp.
Pamphlet No. 1 1976, & Supp. Pamphlet No. 2, pt. 1 1976). The latter encompasses
the Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1"601-1667e (West 1974, Cum. Supp. 1976,
Supp. Pamphlet No. 1 1976, & Supp. Pamphlet No. 2, pt. 1 1976), the Fair Credit
Billing Act, 15 U.S.C.A. 55 1666-1666j (West Cum. Supp. 1976 & Supp. Pamphlet
No. 2, pt. 1 1976), and the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C.A. 1691-1691f
(West Cum. Supp. 1976 & Supp. Pamphlet No. 2, pt. 1 1976).
2. Pub. L. No. 94-239, 90 Stat. 251 (codified at 15 U.S.C.A. § 1691-1691f
(West Supp. Pamphlet No. 2, pt. 1 1976)) (amending Equal Credit Opportunity Act
of 1974, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691-1691e (Supp. V 1975)) [hereinafter cited as amendments].
3. The original Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1691-1691e (Supp.
V 1975), became effective Oct. 28, 1975. Pub. L. No. 90-321, § 707, 88 Stat. 1525
(1974).
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lations will create a new maze of paperwork and increase the threat
of capricious lawsuits, thus making credit more expensive and less avail-
able to those in need, while driving the smaller creditor from the
market. Consumer advocates see the legislation as a way to extend
credit to worthy persons struggling in an economic system that makes
credit a necessity of life. It is too early to determine the precise im-
pact of the amendments on either consumers or the credit industry as a
whole. It is possible, however, to outline those key provisions that are
most likely to bring about change in current credit-granting procedures.
An evaluation of those provisions must consider not only the policy issues
behind congressional action but also any potentially counterproductive
results of the new law.
Despite the massive and complex credit legislation Congress has
passed since 1968 there has been little protection for the consumer who
is denied credit on grounds not logically related to the evaluation of
a good credit risk. Testimony at congressional hearings in 1973 re-
vealed unsurprising patterns of inherently discriminat6ry credit-grant-
ing procedures, particularly with regard to women and the elderly.4
Some of the criticized procedures were clearly offensive;" others, though
neutral in motive, were discriminatory in effectA Congress responded to
the hearings, and to extensive lobbying pressure from women's groups,
by passing the Equal Credit Opportunity Act of 1974 (the Act).7 The
Act barred discrimination on the basis of sex or marital status but omit-
ted several significant protection and enforcement provisions consid-
ered crucial by consumer advocates."
4. Hearings on the Economic Problems of Women Before the Joint Economic
Comm., 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973) [hereinafter cited as Joint Comm. Hearings]; Hear-
ings on H.R. 14856 Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Affairs of the House Comm. on
Banking and Currency, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1973).
5. There have been reports that when a married couple applied for a home
loan, some loan officials discounted the wife's income unless the wife had had
a hysterectomy. Joint Comm. Hearings, supra note 4, at 192 (setting forth the practice
of Veterans Administration loan officials as an example).
6. It was also common practice to discount a mortgage applicant's part-time
income as unreliable; this has had an adverse effect on women who make up a great
percentage of the part-time work force. Comment, Equal Credit: Promise or Reality?,
11 IHAv. C.R.-C.L L. Rnv. 186, 196-97 (1976).
7. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691-1691e (Supp. V 1975). An overview of the law is provided
in Note, Consumer Protection: The Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 28 OLaA. L. Rnv.
577 (1975). The impact of the 1974 Act and accompanying regulations on lenders
is discussed in Mortimer, A Creditor's Preliminary Look at Regulation B, 93 BANKINO
LJ. 417 (1976). The impact of the Act on low-income persons is discussed in Baker
& Taubman, The Equal Credit Opportunity Act: The Effect of the Regulations on the
Poor, 9 CLEARNGHOUSE REV. 543 (1975).
8. For instance, in noting the Federal Reserve Board's failure to include a re-
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The ensuing attempt by the Federal Reserve Board (the Board)
to promulgate regulations implementing the 1974 Act produced hard-
fought debate of the kind that might well have preceded the drafting
of the bill itself.' The regulations as. finally promulgated were a dis-
appointment to many consumer advocates who had hoped the Board
might take the broadest possible view of the legislation by requiring
more affirmative activity on the part of creditors. In addition to their
displeasure with- the regulations, some congressmen and consumer
groups were still committed to expanding the legislation's coverage to
protect other groups historically denied credit for irrelevant reasons.' 0
To incorporate these needs into the existing legislative framework,
Congress in 1975 instituted a new round of hearings," which culmi-
nated in the passage of the Equal Credit Opportunity Act Amendments
of 1976.
Once again, the Federal Reserve Board must implement this legis-
lation; proposed rules are currently in print 2 and hearings are being
held to solicit public and industry reaction. 3 The expanded scope of
the Act along with new procedural and enforcement devices provided
by the amendments unfortunately has created new ambiguities. In
an effort to address these ambiguities the Board has proposed detailed
rules that may create traps even for the creditor who in good faith at-
tempts to comply with the law. 4 Such a maze of complex rules also
quirement for explanation of denial of credit by the creditor, Representative Patterson
said, "These regulations ... almost make it impossible for the system designed by
the Congress to be used at all." 121 CONG. REc. E5351 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1975).
9. Proposed rules were published in April, 40 Fed. Reg. 18,183 (1975), but
were not satisfactory to creditors so a revised version was published a few months
later, 40 Fed. Reg. 42,030 (1975). Women's groups and consumer advocates found
these rules too weak and urged that further .changes be made. The final regulations,
40 Fed. Reg. 49,298 (1975)-published one week before the deadline set by the legis-
lation-represent an attempt at compromise.
10. A bill introduced by Senator Biden also would have prohibited discrimination
on the basis of "political affiliation," and would have given the Board authority to
establish "such other classifications" as were found appropriate. S. 1927, 94th Cong.,
1st Sess. § 701, reprinted in Equal Credit Opportunity Act Amendments and Consumer
Leasing Act-1975: Hearings on S. 483, S. 1900, S. 1927, S. 1961 and H.R. 5616 Be-
fore the Subcomm. on Consumer Affairs of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and
Urban Affairs, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975) [hereinafter cited as 1975 Hearings].
11. 1975 Hearings, supra note 10.
12. 41 Fed. Reg. 29,877 (1976).
13. Id. at 29,870.
14. For instance, in an effort to protect married women from being unfairly penal-
ized in a credit scoring scheme because they do not have phone listings, the proposed
rules stipulate that a creditor "shall not take into account the existence of a telephone
listing in the name of the applicant" but may consider "the existence of a telephone
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makes it difficult to identify consumer rights and remedies under the
law. In order to construe the amendments and the rules in the face
of this potential confusion it is important to identify the policy consid-
erations underlying the legislation: Therefore, a review of the amend-
ments' most significant provisions must focus upon their intended im-
pact and attempt to identify potential pitfalls facing consumers and
creditors.
THE "STATEMENT OF REASONS" CLAUSE
Potentially the most significant provision of the 1976 amendments
is the "statement of reasons" clause. 5 As approved, this provision
states that creditors are obligated to provide 'any rejected credit appli-
cant who so requests with "specific reasons" explaining the denial. In
contrast, the original Senate bill, which received the support of many
consumer advocates, would have required that such reasons be given
automatically to the rejected applicant at the time he or she was in-
formed of the adverse action.' 6
Although resigned to some degree of additional regulation, cred-
itors fought at least to limit the proposed legislative provisions; the
modified "statement of reasons" clause represents one of their victories.
However, examination of the motives behind the opposition to this sec-
tion indicate that the "victory" may be less important than it seemed.
Creditors have cited increased cost as the main reason for their
objections to the clause,17 but in light of other legislative requirements
in the residence of an applicant .... " 41 Fed. Reg. 29,881 (1976) (proposed rule
§ 202.6(b) (3)).
15. (2) Each applicant against whom adverse action is taken shall be
entitled to a statement of reasons for such action from the creditor. A cred-
itor satisfies this obligation by-
(A) providing statements of reasons in writing as a matter of course
to applicants against whom adverse action is taken; or
(B) giving written notification of adverse action which discloses
(i) the applicant's right to a statement of. reasons ....
(3) A statement of reasons meets the requirements of this section only
if it contains the specific reasons for the adverse action taken.
15 U.S.C.A. § 1691(d) (2), (3) (West Supp. Pamphlet No. 2, pt. 1 1976).
16. "A creditor shall promptly furnish each applicant who 1has applied for credit
and to whom credit is denied or terminated a clear and meaningful statement in writing
of the reasons for the denial or termination." S. 1927, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 701(d),
reprinted in 1975 Hearings, supra note 10, at 148.
17. Sears, Roebuck and Co. prepared data indicating that each letter of rejection
could cost over $5.00 to prepare, and that multiplied by the new account rejections
in 1974, the cost of sending such letters would be over $8 million. 1975 Hearings,
supra note 10, at 402. This assumes that each letter would be individually drafted
and typed.
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this reason may not be valid. For example, creditors are required to
inform rejected applicants in writing of adverse action taken on any ap-
plications.' 8 Thus, if an applicant requests an explanation of the credit
denial the lendor is required to write a second time, providing the state-
ment of reasons. This statement may take the form of a prepared
checklist 0 on which the creditor would check appropriate explanatory
phrases. By automatically including this statement with the first letter,
the lender saves the time, effort and expense of preparing a second
response.
The advantages of such a checklist may convince creditors to go
beyond the minimal response required by the legislation; indeed some
creditors already are employing this system.20 Direct and honest com-
munication with a potential customer is likely to produce public good
will, which is particularly important to a service industry whose com-
munity reputation is a critical business consideration. 1 An individual
applicant may respond favorably to a clear explanation of his or her
failure to qualify for credit and may be encouraged to reapply after
meeting the appropriate requirements.
The automatic statement also decreases the likelihood that an ap-
plicant will deny having received a response to his or her request for
a written explanation of the adverse action. Thus it seems possible
that from a business standpoitit, creditors may be convinced to go be-
yond the requirements of the law, despite their prior vigorous opposi-
tion to the "statement of reasons" section. The advantages of incurring
the additional expense involved may be more convincing if substantial
judgments are awarded against lenders who violate this provision of the
law.
18. A creditor must give the applicant a written statement of the reasons for
the rejection or notify the applicant in writing of his or her right to have such a
statement. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1691(d) (2), (3) (West Supp. Pamphlet No. 2, pt. 1 1976),
quoted in note 15 supra.
19. The Board's proposed rules include a sample checklist which, if properly com-
pleted by the creditor, establishes compliance with the "specific reasons" requirement.
41 Fed. Reg. 29,882 (1976) (proposed rule § 202.9(b) (2)).
20. Representatives of National BankAmericard testified at congressional hearings
that in the interest of public relations, member banks are encouraged to employ al-
ternative form letters and inform the rejected applicant of why he or she was not
awarded credit. 1975 Hearings, supra note 10, at 367. Informal inquiry by the author
reveals that North Carolina Wachovia banks offering MasterCharge are instructed to
include a checklist explanation when informing a customer that his or her MasterCharge
application is not being accepted.
21. "[Flor the most part there is no national market for consumer credit. Con-
sumers seldom shop for credit outside their town or city .... ." NATIONAL CoMMIs-
SION ON CONSUMER FINANCE, CONSUMER CREDIT IN THE UNrrED STATES 11 (1972)
[hereinafter cited as NCCF REPORT].
19771 271
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55
Although it is difficult to predict, it seems unlikely that large num-
bers of credit applicants will request the written explanation to which
they are entitled. 2 In light of this fact, it would seem that the goal
of establishing a more critical and informed class of consumers would
have been better achieved by requiring automatic disclosure of the rea-,
sons for rejection. Nevertheless, the "specific reasons" clause estab-
lishes the principle that a credit applicant is entitled to know why a
lending institution did not find him to be an acceptable credit risk. Rec-
ognition of this principle is, in itself, an important development, even
if the legislation's precise language does not go far enough toward en-
couraging the growth of an informed class of credit consumers.2"
CLASSIFICATION OF BORROWERS
Less concrete protection for the credit -consumer is found in the
statute's specification of particulair categories of people against whom
creditors cannot discriminate. 24  Although the categories of race, 25
color, religion and national origin are potentially important, the inclu-
sion of a prohibition on age discrimination has proved to be the most
controversial. Here again, industry representatives achieved their ob-
jectives by convincing legislators that if the category of age were added
as a protected classification, it should not be barred from use as a factor
22. While not definitive, an informal questionnaire mailed to selected member
banks by National BankAmericard indicated that 10-15% of rejected applicants contact
the bank for further information when invited to do so; for those banks that did
not invite inquiry only 1% inquired. 1975 Hearings, supra note 10, at 375-82..
23. By including the "statement of reasons" provision Congress also expressed
a desire to provide a victim of credit discrimination with potential courtroom evidence.
Although a creditor is not going to explain the applicant's rejection in terms of dis-
criminatory motives, a rejection statement based on clearly inappropriate reasons will
make better legal ammunition than no statement at all. See SENATE REP. No. 94-
589, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 8, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 635, 642.
24. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1691(a) (West Supp. Pamphlet No. 2, pt. 1 1976) reads as
follows:
(a) It shall be unlawful for any creditor to discriminate against any
applicant, with respect to any aspect of a credit transaction-
(1) on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin, sex or mari-
tal status, or age (provided the applicant has the capacity to contract);
(2) because all or part of the applicant's income derives from any
public assistance program;.or
(3) because the applicant has in good faith exercised'any right under
this chapter.
25. A 1975 pilot survey confirmed the existence of racial discrimination by show-
ing that black applicants for mortgage loans are turned down almost twice as frequently
as white applicants of similar economic circumstances. COMPTROLLER OF TIM CUR-
RENCY, ADMINISTRATOR OF NATIONAL BANKS FAir HousING PRACTICE PILOT PROJECr,
1975, reprinted in 1975 Hearings, supra note 10, at 481-526.
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in credit scoring schemes. In effect, the amendments ban only the ar-
bitrary use of age when making credit decisions.16  For instance, the
young person having difficulty obtaining a loan because he or she lacks
a credit rating may find this legislation of little help; creditors still will
be able to deny credit on that ground.27 The new law would appear
to prohibit some of the discriminatory practices cited in the legislative
record,2 though creditors can inquire about age in relation to other
"valid" credit factors such as credit history and employment record. If
the amendments do result in credit extension to some elderly persons
presently denied credit in an arbitrary manner, creditors should not
foresee economic loss. Studies suggest29 and common sense reinforces
the notion that persons over sixty-five often are better able to assess their
ability to repay loans, have better credit histories and are in general
more conservative about assuming debts.
The prohibition of age discrimination was particularly intended to
protect the elderly; however, the effects -of expanding the law's cov-
erage to additional groups (the terms "race," "color," "religion," "na-
tional origin" and "age' are new) may well go beyond protection of
each individual classification. Because the persons now protected from
discriminatory credit-granting practices include those Americans histor-
ically denied equal opportunity in many social and economic spheres,
the language suggests that Congress would favor broad and inclusive
judicial construction of the equal credit opportunity legislation.
°
26. The amendments prohibit discrimination on the basis of age but provide that
the creditor may make inquiries concerning age to determine "probable continuance
of income levels [or] credit history." 15 U.S.C.A. § 1691(b) (2) (West Supp. Pamphlet
No. .2, pt. 1 1976). Age may be considered in an "empirically derived credit system"
if such a systeni does not operate so that the age of an elderly applicant is given
a "negative factor or value." Id. §§ 1691(b) (2), (3). These quoted terms are defined
by the Board in the proposed rules at 41 Fed. Reg. 29,872 (1976) (proposed rules
§ 202.2(o) & (u)). At least one commentator has suggested that the legislation will
"preclude age as a meaningful component of a credit scoring system" because whenever
one age bracket is given favorable treatment the result is to "discriminate" against
other age groups. Comment, The 1976 Amendments to the Equal Credit Opportunity
Act, 28 BAYLOR L. Ry. 633, 641 (1976).
27. If a rejected applicant could establish that basing credit denials on lack of
credit rating results in disproportionate rejection of persons under age 26, it seems
likely that a creditor would be able to justify his position by showing that lack of
credit rating has a "manifest relationship to creditworthiness," as this phrase is used
in the Board's proposed rules. 41 Fed. Reg. 29,879, 29,880 n.7 (1976) (proposed
rule § 202.1(x), .6(a)). For another proposed rule on this issue, see note 42 infra.
28. Apparently many creditors, particularly banks offering credit chiecking ac-
counts, automatically terminate credit extension when the customer reaches age 65.
1975 Hearings, supra note 10, at 78-92.
29. 1975 Hearings, supra note 10, at 438.
30. On the other hand, a specific test as opposed to a more general prohibition
of "discrimination based on immaterial grounds" leaves unprotected specific .groups of.
19"77]
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CMIL LIABILITY
Broad construction and successful consumer litigation will not
alone deter those creditors who are determined to continue violating
the letter and the spirit of the law. In those cases, it seems that only
severe financial penalties will provide an effective deterrent; the amend-
ments' liability provisions represent an effort to create such a deterrent.
In addition to actual damages, costs and attorneys' fees, an individual
may recover up to $10,000 in punitive damages; for class actions, puni-
tive damages are limited to $500,000. or one percent of the creditor's
net worth, whichever is less.31 It should be noted that these terms rep-
resent a considerable concession to the industry. The originally pro-
posed limits-$50,000 or one percent of net worth, whichever was
greater 52 -were rejected, presumably because committee members did
not favor multi-million dollar recoveries of punitive damages. 8
persons such as the physically handicapped. The committee rejected a provision in
the Senate bill that would have allowed the Board to add new classifications, presumably
on the ground that such a grant of authority would permit an executive body to exer-
cise powers reserved to the legislature. S. 1927, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 701(a)(b)
(1975), reprinted in 1975 Hearings, supra note 10, at 147.
31. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1691e (West Supp. Pamphlet No. 2, pt. 1 1976) reads in
part as follows:
(a) Any creditor who fails to comply with any requirement imposed
under this subchapter shall be liable to the aggrieved applicant in an amount
equal to the sum of any actual damages sustained by such applicant acting
either in an individual capacity or as a representative of a class.
(b) Any creditor . . . who fails to comply . . . shall be liable to the
aggrieved applicant for punitive damages in an amount not greater than
$10,000 . . . except that in the case of a class action the total recovery
under this subsection shall not exceed the lesser of $500,000 or 1 per centum
of the net worth of the creditor...
(d) In the case of any successful action . . . the costs of the action,
together with a reasonable attorney's fee as determined by the court, shall
be added to any damages awarded ....
32. S. 1927, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 706(b) (1975), reprinted in 1975 Hearings,
supra note 10, at 150.
33. The proposed and adopted provisions produce vastly different results, as an
example will illustrate. Assume a successful class action is brought against Sears,
Roebuck Acceptance Corporation (net worth approximately $707,000,000). Under the
provisions as proposed, liability could be as high as $7,070,000. As adopted, the legis-
lation would limit liability to $500,000. Actual damages, costs and fees must be added
to these figures.
The results are also significantly different in relation to a small creditor, whose
net worth is, for instance, $50,000. Under the section as proposed, he could lose
his entire business in a successful class action suit.' As the law now stands, liability
for punitive damages could not exceed $500 in his case. These larger awards could
be limited if the class did not include enough members, since no individual can recover
more than $10,000. (Sears Roebuck Acceptance Corporation net worth figures for
1974 appear in 1975 Hearings, supra note 10, at 281.)
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The compromise $500,000 figure (increased from $100,000 in the
Equal Credit Opportunity Act3 4) was designed to provide incentive for
class actions while discouraging the frivolous litigation some feared
would occur if recovery were limited only by the one percent ceiling.
While this may discourage class actions when the class includes more
than fifty persons,35 commentators have pointed out that class actions
may not be the appropriate remedy for so personal and subjective an
act as discrimination. 6
Only a class action, however, can result in the tremendous finan-
cial sanctions that would deter a creditor from repeatedly violating the
law. Individual actions, which are limited to a $10,000 recovery,3 7 pro-
vide a remedy for the applicant but at small relative cost to the creditor.
It is the threat of larger losses that, in theory, creates the motivation
to comply. This motivation is inevitably weakened by limiting the
scope of the class action. The conflict over the liability provisions re-
flects a broader controversy surrounding the class action device itself. 88
While imperfect, and vulnerable to attorney abuse, the class action re-
mains the most significant private tool available for challenging a dis-
criminatory credit practice that violates numerous persons' rights under
the law but does not result in actual damages.89
However, creditors were quick-and correct-to point out that
the amendments do not limit recovery of punitive damages to situations
of intentional or knowing violation of the law.40 The committee report
34. 15 U.S.C. § 1691e(c) (Supp. V 1975) (amended 1976).
35. In theory, this is because an individual could not recover the maximum in-
dividual award of $10,000 if the maximum class action award had to be split into
more than 50 shares.
36. See 1975 Hearings, supra note 10, at 627; Note, Consumer Protection: The
Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 28 OKLA. L. REV. 577 (1975). On the other hand,
the class action would seem the perfect way to attack a policy that arbitrarily puts
a blanket end to credit checking accounts when customers reach the age of 65. See
note, 28 supra.
37. See note 31 supra.
38. Discussion of the class action as a consumer tool is found in Fetterly, The
Application of the Class Action to Consumer Litigation, 24 FED'N INS. COUNSEL Q. 4
(1973); Landers, Of Legalized Blackmail and Legalized Theft: Consumer Class Actions
and the Substance-Procedure Dilemma, 47 S. CAL. L. REv. 842 (1974).
39. In addition to private civil actions, the amendments authorize the Attorney
General to bring civil suits "whenever he has reason to believe that one or more
creditors are engaged in a pattern or practice in violation (of the law]." 15 U.S.C.A.
§ 1691e(h) (West Supp. Pamphlet No..2, pt. 1 1976).
40. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1691e(b) (West Supp. Pamphlet No. 2, pt. 1 1976) provides
that
[i]n determining the amount of [punitive] damages in any action, the court
shall consider, among other relevant factors, the amount of any actual damages
awarded, the frequency and persistence of failures of compliance by the cred-
1977] 275
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suggests that liability should be determined by applying the now famous
"effects test," which grew out of employment discrimination cases."
This would shift to the creditor-defendant the burden of proving that
credit practices that result in rejection of disproportionate numbers of
persons, in protected classes are material to making sound credit de-
cisions. Translating these courtroom burdens of proof into business
procedures designed to avoid litigation suggests the employment of a
scheme of affirmative review.by creditors. Such a scheme would re-
quire a review of application procedures to determine if disproportion-
ate numbers of persons in protected classifications were being rejected
as poor credit risks.42 If this were occurring, the creditor would have
to determine if the application qualifications responsible for this result
were necessary to assess credit risks validly. Even if such qualifications
were materially related to assessing credit risks, a broad application of
the "effects test" would seem to require that the creditor make some
effort to devise other qualifications that would further the desired eval-
uation process without producing the accompanying discriminatory ef-
fect.
Whether creditors seek to avoid litigation by instituting such an
affirmative review system will depend on how aggressively consumers
pursue their rights (particularly in the form of class actions) and also
on how broadly courts apply the "effects test" as outlined in race dis-
crimination and employment cases. By suggesting that the courts ex-
amine impact in addition to intent, it would seem that Congress has
expressed support for procedural devices that will spread the costs of
itor, the resources of the creditor, the number of persons adversely affected,
and the extent to which the creditor's failure of compliance was intentional.
The proposed rules indicate that an "inadvertent error" is not a violation of the
"statement of reasons" requirement, 41 Fed. Reg. 29,883 (1976) (proposed rule §
202.9(e), but "inadvertent error" is narrowly defined. 41 Fed. Reg. 29,883 (1976)
(proposed rule § 202.10(c)).
41. In determining the existence of [unlawful] discrimination . . . courts
or agencies are free to look at the effects of a creditor's motives or conduct
in individual transactions. Thus judicial constructions of anti-discrimination
legislation in the employment field in cases such as Griggs v. Duke Power
Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), and Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S.
405 (1975) are intended to serve as guides in the application of this act
SENATE REP. No. 94-589, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 4-5, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CoNe.
& AD. Nnws 635, 638.
42. The proposed rule specifically proscribes in several instances . . the
use of insufficiently refined general information which is accordingly not caus-
ally related to a determination of creditworthiness where the effect of using
such information would be to discriminate against an applicant on a prohibited
basis, even though the creditor may have no intent to discriminate.
41 Fed. Reg. 29,880 n.7 (1976) (proposed rule § 202.6(b)).
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correcting social problems among businesses and industries that have
profited from the advantages of the American market.
POTENTIAL PROBLEMS
The "effects test," however, has been developed and expanded
on a case by case basis over time.43 It is the prospect of having to
employ legal counsel to interpret the test's requirements that prompts
creditors to complain of overregulation and unwarranted government
intrusion. Even if actual costs of disclosure and application-form revi-
sion are kept to a minimum, there is still an expressed fear that the ad-
ditional regulation and its accompanying legal complexities could force
the small lender out of the credit business.44 In an effort to address
this concern Congress included a provision exempting the very small
creditor from the "statement of reasons" requirement. 45  Nonetheless,
many creditors have seemed overwhelmed by the complexity of the
new law, the increasing need for legal advice in order to comply with
its provisions and the potential for litigation.46 Even the most clearly
worded regulations may not dispel this fear, given the complex nature
of the credit industry.47  At worst this development could mean a re-
duction in the number of middle-level creditors as they relinquish their
share of the market to the giants of the industry. For instance, a busi-
nessman who extends credit as part of a small retail operation may opt
for a major credit card arrangement to avoid potential litigation.
A reduction in the number of small creditors would work against
consumer interests, if only because there would be fewer alternative
43. See Boston Chapter NAACP v. Beecher, 504 F.2d 1017, 1019 (1st Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 421 U.S. 910 (1975), in which the court found that particular employment
requirements were not sufficiently job-related to justify their discriminatory effects. But
see Parrish v. Board of Comm'rs, 533 F.2d 942, 949 (5th Cir. 1976), in which the
court ruled that although the state bar examination resulted in disproportionate rejection
of black applicants, the test as administered was a legitimate evaluation of job-related
skills.
44. See note 46 infra.
45. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1691(d) (5) (West Supp. Pamphlet No. 2, pt. 1 1976) exempts
from the "statement of reasons" requirement those creditors "who did not act on more
than one hundred and fifty applications during the calendar year preceding the calendar
year in which the adverse action is taken."
46. This concern was expressed by a small retailer from Massachusetts; that state
has enacted credit legislation similar to the federal law. MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 151B,
§ 4(3B), (4), (10), (12), (14), (15) (Michie/Law. Co-op 1976). The retailer said
that in his town in one month alone "11 independent retailers went from their own
charge into Bank charges because they felt they couldn't comply with the Massachusetts
regulations." 1975 Hearings, supra note 10, at 387.
47. NCCF RnPoRT, supra note 21, at 207.
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lending schemes available. It seems likely that a nationwide credit and
finance company would establish less flexible policies than a local mer-
chant familiar with his market and more willing to extend credit to a
local resident. With fewer existing systems of assessing credit charges,
the consumer is less able to fit payment plans to his or her individual
needs.17  And fewer creditors means, at least in theory, less competi-
tion to keep down the price of money.48
Whether a reduction in the number of small creditors will be an
inevitable result of increased industry regulation is difficult to predict,
because it depends on small lenders' perception of the law as much
as on the law itself. However, this legislation is only a small part of
the overall problems faced by small businesses today. It is unlikely
that repeal of the amendments would help a small businessman as
much as would clear regulations setting forth for the well-intentioned
creditor a plan or policy that would establish compliance with the law.40
Ultimately, some degree of complexity will be inevitable and must be
accepted as part of an increasingly interdependent and technologically
sophisticated society. Although the legislators were made aware of the
small businessman's problems, the committee report accompanying the
amendments leads to the conclusion that Congress' overwhelming pri-
ority was to halt the policies that have made it virtually impossible for
some American credit consumers to participate in the existing Ameri-
can economic framework. 50
In order to predict how successful the amendments will be in
achieving this congressional goal it is important to recognize the limita-
tions of the legislation. The amendments represent an attempt. to re-
48. Less competition would mean the possibility of collective price setting, less
service for high-risk customers and prevention of entry into the market by potential
competitors. Id. at 209-11.
49. For instance, use of the Board's proposed checklist of credit criteria consti-
tutes compliance with the "statement of reasons" requirement. See note 19 supra.
If extended too far, however, this device could be used to shift the risk of noncompli-
ance to the Board; it is therefore important that the Board make clear, as it has
in its proposed rules, that Board members will not have "authority to approve particular
creditors' forms in any manner." 41 Fed. Reg. 29,878 (1976) (proposed rule § 202.1
(c) (5)).
50. Senator Jesse Helms did not share the view that federal legislation is the
best way to achieve the stated goals:
These amendments are just one more nail in the coffin of the right of the
individual to have local matters determined by the State legislatures. ...
Not only has the Congress been encroaching on [the] right[s] of the
States . . .it has also usurped much of the vital decisionmaking power for-
mally exercised by business and consumers in a free market.
12Z CONG. REC. S1021 (daily ed. Feb. 2, 1976).
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dress grievances that are inextricably wound with much larger social,
political and economic problems. While outlawing certain discrimina-
tory credit-granting practices, the amendments do not challenge the
catch-22 of the underlying economic system. Credit is often denied
because the applicant does not have a credit history; for many this vici-
ous circle cannot be broken. Persons with low incomes are often un-
able to obtain loans though they may be perfectly capable of slowly
repaying a small loan. And because credit has become so integral a
part of the American economic system 5' the individual defined as a
"bad" credit risk all too frequently turns to the thriving underworld of
loan sharks and extortionists.
And yet if credit is going to remain an important tool for improv-
ing the standard of living, as well as for aiding the individual through
temporary periods of financial difficulty, it is imperative that such a tool
be universally available. If the amendments result in efforts on the
part of lending institutions to reassess established credit scoring schemes,
as well as in greater consumer imderstanding of creditors' lending cri-
teria, they should be called a success.5 2
DONNA HELEN TRiPTOW
Federal Jurisdiction-Environmental Law-Do Private Citizens
Have a Right To Bring Action To Abate Water Pollution Under
Federal Common Law?
The Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of .1972'
set, a goal of ending all pollutant discharges into navigable waters by
1985.2 This lofty goal will be difficult to obtain8 even with congres-
51. "Between . . . 1950 and 1971 consumer credit outstanding rose from $21.5
billion to $137.2 billion, an increase of over five times . . . ." NCCF REPoRT, supra
note 21, at 5.
52. The legislation, however, does not address the problems created by an ever-
increasing national, corporate and individual debt. This increased debt is one manifes-
tation of the "rising expectations" politicians have taught us to fear, but we are contin-
ually urged to "relax" and "charge it."
1. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376"(Supp. V 1975).
2. Id. § 1251(a) (1).
3. McThenia, An Examination of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act
Amendments of 1972, 30 WASH. & LEE L Rnv. 195, 208 (1973).
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